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COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

By Douglas A. Kahn
Douglas A. Kahn is the Paul G. Kauper Professor of
Law at the University of Michigan Law School.
The author concludes that, contrary to the IRS and
the Tax Court’s position, a single lump sum payment
to a divorced spouse can qualify for alimony treatment
in some circumstances subject to the front-loading
rules. The author also contends that to conform to the
requirement of the alimony provision, a payment of a
divorced spouse’s legal or medical expenses under a
divorce or separation instrument should qualify for
alimony treatment even though those payments usually will not satisfy the literal terms of the statute.
Before 1942 alimony paid to a former spouse was not
included in the spouse’s gross income.1 In 1942 Congress
adopted the antecedent to section 71.2 Although an
alimony3 recipient must recognize gross income, section
215 provides the payer with a nonitemized deduction for
the payment.4 Therefore, the alimony tax provisions
provide a congressionally approved income-splitting arrangement which can benefit the parties by shifting
income from a high-bracket taxpayer to one in a lower tax
bracket. The parties can divide the resulting savings
between them by altering the amount paid to the former
spouse.
The alimony provisions were apparently adopted in
1942 because World War II generated a surtax that
increased many people’s tax liability and reduced their
net after-tax income. Income splitting between divorced
spouses was adopted to make it feasible for separated
spouses to live off of the same income that the couple had
before separating. That tax treatment of alimony still
exists in the code, although significant changes in the
operation of the statutes were made in 1984 and 1986.
Note that the term ‘‘alimony’’ has a special meaning in
tax law that is not identical to the use of the term for state
law purposes. Thus, an item that is characterized as
alimony by state law will not necessarily be characterized
as alimony for tax purposes, and vice versa. To qualify as
alimony for tax purposes, a payment must be made in
cash under a divorce or separate maintenance decree or a

1

Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917); Douglas v. Willcuts, 296
U.S. 1 (1935).
2
All citations to a section number are to sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
3
Section 71 applies to both alimony and to separate maintenance payments. In this article, references to alimony include
separate maintenance payments as well.
4
Section 62(a)(10) makes the section 215 deduction a nonitemized deduction.
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The committee bill attempts to define alimony in a
way that would conform to general notions of what
type of payments constitute alimony as distinguished from property settlements and to prevent
the deduction of large, one-time lump sum property settlements.8
Congress has chosen not to prohibit alimony characterization for one-time lump sum payments, but to deny
alimony treatment for part of those payments by adopting a recapture rule — the so-called front-loading rule —
if the alimony payment in either of the first two years in
which payments are made is significantly larger than the
amount of alimony paid in the third year.9 In the third

5

Section 71(b)(1)(A) and (2).
See reg. section 1.71-1(b)(1)(i).
7
Temp. reg. section 1.71-1T(a), Q-3 and A-3.
8
H.R. Rept. No. 98-432, Part II, 1498 (1984).
9
Section 71(f). As originally adopted in 1984, section 71(f)
would have denied an alimony deduction for a payment in
excess of $10,000 unless the payment was required to be made
in each of six consecutive years. That provision would prevent
alimony treatment for that amount of a single lump sum
payment that exceeded $10,000. However, that requirement was

year, if the front-loading rule applies, the payer spouse is
required to take into income an amount equal to some of
the deduction he obtained in the first two years of
making alimony payments; and the payee spouse is
granted a nonitemized deduction for an equal amount of
the alimony payments that she took into income in the
first two years.10 The effect of this provision is to reverse
the deduction that the payer obtained and the income
that the payee recognized for the excessive amount of
payments made in the first two years.
Section 71(b)(1)(D) is one of the provisions designed to
identify payments that are excluded from alimony treatment because they are more likely to be property settlements. That provision denies alimony treatment to a
payment if there is any liability to make the payment
after the death of the payee spouse or if, after the death of
the payee spouse, there is an obligation to make a
payment in substitution for those payments. It is this
provision that creates the greatest obstacle for a single
lump sum payment, or payments of legal fees incurred in
a divorce or of medical expenses. Let us first examine the
treatment of a single lump sum payment.
A major case dealing with this issue is Webb v. Commissioner.11 In that case, H and W executed a written
separation agreement that required H to pay W a lump
sum of $215,000, to be paid on the signing of the
agreement. The agreement did not contain a provision
terminating H’s obligation if W should die before payment was made, nor would local law have done so. The
parties executed the agreement and, in accordance with
its terms, H simultaneously paid W the required
$215,000. Viewing the tax characterization of the payments differently, H sought to deduct the payment as
alimony under section 215, and W did not include the
payments in her gross income. Taking inconsistent positions, the IRS asserted deficiencies against H and W, both
of whom petitioned the Tax Court. The Tax Court sided
with W and held that the payments were not alimony so
that H was not entitled to a deduction and W had no
income. The court held that because the payment would
have been required to be made even if W had died after
executing the agreement, but before the payment was
made, the payment did not constitute alimony because of
section 71(b)(1)(D). The court deemed it irrelevant that
the payments were made simultaneously with the signing of the agreement that created the liability and that W
was alive then. The court indicated that it was influenced
in its decision by the fact that the $215,000 payment
clearly was not made for the support or maintenance of
W. It obviously was a property settlement. The Tax
Court’s decision was cited with approval by the IRS in
TAM 9542001 (July 10, 1995), 95 TNT 206-32. I will discuss
that technical advice memorandum later.

6

eliminated by the amendment to section 71(f) that was made in
1986. The only limitation on a lump sum payment is the
front-loading recapture rule described in the text.
10
Id.
11
T.C. Memo. 1990-540; see also Sperling v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2009-141, Doc 2009-13721, 2009 TNT 114-6.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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written instrument incident to that decree, a written
separation agreement, or a decree ordering support or
maintenance for a spouse.5
In general parlance, alimony refers to support or
maintenance provided to a separated or divorced spouse.
Congress limited the application of alimony treatment to
payments of that nature by denying alimony characterization to payments that appeared more likely to
represent property settlements or payments for the support of children of the marriage. The pre-1984 version of
section 71 required that the payments be periodic and be
in satisfaction of a legal obligation arising out of a marital
or family relationship.6 Those requirements were eliminated in 1984, and there is no requirement that the
payments be periodic or that they relate to a legal
obligation derived from a marital relationship.7
There are provisions in section 71 that are designed to
preclude alimony treatment for specific circumstances
when it is likely that the payment is a property settlement
and not a support payment for the spouse. There is no
general provision that excludes a payment from alimony
because it looks more like a property settlement. Instead,
only those payments that fall within the specified conditions in the statute are precluded from alimony treatment. It is possible, however, that a court or the IRS
might be influenced in construing and applying the
alimony provisions by its perception that the item in
question appears more likely to be a property settlement
or more likely to be support for the spouse.
There is no provision denying alimony treatment
because an item is a single lump sum payment; those
payments will be disallowed only if they run afoul of a
provision in section 71. That is one of the consequences of
having eliminated the requirement that payments be
periodic. The House report on the Tax Reform Act of 1984
contains this statement concerning the amended version
of the alimony provisions:
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If an alimony payment is not made on time and if the
payee spouse dies before a late payment is made, the IRS
implicitly agrees that the liability of the payer to make the
payment in arrears to the payee’s estate after the payee’s
death does not trigger the prohibition against a liability

being payable after the payee’s death. In TAM 9542001,13
the IRS indicated that a payment after the death of a
payee of alimony that was in arrears ‘‘is simply a
payment made late for an already existing obligation.
This obligation must terminate no later than the death of
the payee spouse in order to meet the requirement of
section 71(b)(1)(D).’’ That last sentence is bewildering
because the liability to pay the amount in arrears did not
terminate on the death of the payee spouse. How is that
late payment different from the payment involved in
Webb? The technical advice memorandum attempts to
distinguish the late payment from other liabilities that
arose before the payee’s death ‘‘and will continue to exist
in the event [the payee] died before [the payer] made the
payment.’’ But that assertion fails to distinguish the late
payment from the facts of the Webb case or from the facts
involved in the technical advice memorandum. A payment of alimony in arrears is a payment of a liability that
arose before the payee’s death that continues to exist after
the payee dies. The asserted distinction that the IRS made
in the technical advice memorandum applies equally to
payments in arrears and to the other situations that it
sought to distinguish. Contrary to the IRS’s assertion,
there is no meaningful distinction.
The only possible distinction with the Webb situation is
that the payment in Webb would not necessarily be
deemed to be late if made only a few minutes after the
instrument was executed. But lateness is not the critical
factor. What should the critical factor be? It cannot be
sufficient that a liability arose before the payee’s death. If
the amount was not payable before the payee’s death, the
fact that the liability to make a future payment arose
before the payee’s death cannot be enough to avoid
section 71(b)(1)(D). For example, if X is required to pay Y
or Y’s estate $40,000 a year for 10 years, with no termination if Y dies before the expiration of that period, none
of the payments would be alimony because X would be
liable to continue to make them if Y died within the
10-year period. X’s liability to make payments arose
before Y’s death, but if Y died within 10 years, payments
to be made after her death were not payable before she
died. Because it was possible for payments to first
become payable after Y died, all of the payments made to
Y or Y’s estate would not qualify as alimony. The
payments that might be made after Y’s death would be
treated as substitutes for the payments made before Y’s
death, and so all of them would fail to be treated as
alimony.
The critical element that permits alimony in arrears to
be paid after the payee’s death is that the liability was
payable before the payee died, regardless of whether the
payment would be labeled as tardy if made later. Similarly, in the Webb situation, the $215,000 amount had to
become payable while W was still alive, and so the
possibility that payment might be made after her subsequent death should not affect the characterization of
the payment as alimony.

12
See, e.g., reg. section 1.351-1(a)(1), effectively treating transfers by multiple parties to a controlled corporation as having
been made simultaneously if made under a plan.

13
That TAM held that the payer spouse’s payment of a
portion of the attorney fees the payee spouse incurred in a
divorce case was not alimony.

The literal thrust of section 71(b)(1)(D) is that when a
liability is created in a divorce or separation instrument
to make payments to a spouse, none of those payments
(or substitutes for them) can be payable after the spouse’s
death. How does that apply to the payments involved in
Webb? The payments in Webb were required to be made
simultaneously with the execution of the instrument
creating the liability, and W had to be alive to have
executed the agreement. Of course, the payment might
have been made a few minutes after the execution of the
agreement, W could have died in that brief interim
period, and the payment would have to be made even
though W was no longer alive. There is a twofold
problem with construing the provision to apply in that
case. First, it is inconsistent with the tax principle treating
events that are made under a single plan as having
occurred simultaneously even if there was a time lag
between their actual occurrences.12 More importantly, if
the court’s cramped construction were applied elsewhere, it would eliminate from alimony treatment payments that are clearly made for the support and
maintenance of a separated spouse. If so applied, the
most common circumstances for which the provisions
were adopted would not qualify.
For example, under a divorce decree issued in year 1,
H is required to make monthly payments of X dollars to
W on the 20th day of each month. H’s liability ceases on
W’s death. The decree does not state that the payment
must be made at any specific time of the day for
payment. W dies at noon on November 20, year 10, and
H makes the required payment at 2 p.m. of that date.
Local law provides that if the payment is required to be
made on a specified date, it must be made even if the
payee spouse is alive for only part of that day and is not
alive when the payment is actually made. If the reasoning
of the Webb decision were applied, not only would the
payment made on November 20, year 10, be denied
alimony treatment, so would all of the payments that
were made to W before that date because there was the
possibility that W could die on the day a payment was
due before the payment was actually made. That construction unreasonably narrows the scope of the statute.
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While one can sympathize with the court’s desire in
Webb to deny alimony treatment to what obviously was a
property settlement, the decision does not comport with
the policy of the statute. More importantly, if the reasoning of that case were followed in other circumstances, it
would disallow alimony treatment for most of the situations in which Congress intended the provisions to apply.
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14
While it is possible that part of the payments could be for
the purpose of satisfying support and maintenance expenses of
the payee spouse that were unpaid at the payee’s death, it is
likely that most or all of the payments have nothing to do with
the payee spouse’s support and maintenance.
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die before H makes the payment. If, under local law, H
continues to be obligated to make the payment after W
died, the possibility that W might die before payment
would prevent the payment from qualifying as alimony.
There is no policy reason for disallowing alimony treatment in that case.
Parties in a similar position to the Webbs’ can easily
finesse the problem created by that case by simply
providing in the settlement agreement or divorce decree
that no payment will be made if W is not alive. But that
makes the Webb decision a trap for the unwary. Knowledgeable taxpayers can easily avoid it, but the uninformed can be trapped.
Single lump sum payments such as the one made in
Webb are almost certainly settlements of the parties’
property interests rather than a payment to provide for
the support and maintenance of the payee spouse. Congress did not wish property settlements to be treated as
alimony. But Congress did not deal with this situation by
denying alimony treatment entirely. Instead, Congress
chose to prevent alimony treatment for most of a single
lump sum payment by reversing most of the tax consequences of treating it as alimony. They accomplished that
reversal by adopting the front-loading rules of section
71(f). Instead of a court’s resorting to an improper
construction of the statute to prevent alimony treatment
for lump sum payments, it would be better to adhere to
the statutory scheme of denying the benefits of alimony
characterization for most of the payment when the
front-loading rules apply.
Let us now turn to the treatment of a spouse’s payment of the payee spouse’s legal expenses that were
incurred in a divorce case. Relying on the requirement set
forth in section 71(b)(1)(D), the IRS maintains that the
payment of those legal expenses does not qualify as
alimony.15 The Tax Court has adopted the IRS’s view.16
Unlike the case in Webb, a construction of section
71(b)(1)(D) that denies alimony treatment to those payments is not unreasonable; but nevertheless, a different
treatment is warranted. If a court orders a payer spouse
to pay the legal fees incurred by the other spouse in the
divorce, the liability to make the payment arises when
the court’s order is made (or when a written settlement
agreement of the parties containing a provision for the
payment was executed). Payment of those fees, however,
is not due until the attorney bills for the legal services.
Unless the attorney’s bill already existed when the obligation of the payer spouse first arose, it would be
possible for the other spouse to die before the bill is
delivered, and then the payment would first become
payable after the death of the other spouse. The due date
for making the payment cannot arise before the amount
of the fee is determined. However, if the court’s order or
the written agreement stated a specific amount of fee to
be paid to the other spouse or in escrow, and if that
payment is to be made on the issuing of the order or the
execution of the agreement, the payment should then

15

E.g., TAM 9542001.
Berry v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-373, Doc 200032124, 2000 TNT 239-11; Sperling, T.C. Memo. 2009-141.
16
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While the statute requires that there be no liability to
make a payment after death, that language cannot be
applied literally without eviscerating the provision. Literally construed, it would deny alimony treatment in any
situation in which the death of a payee before receiving a
defaulted payment does not discharge the payer of that
liability. It is always possible that a typical alimony
payment might not be made on time, and there is always
the possibility that the payee will not be alive when the
payer makes the late payment. If, as is typically the case
under local law, the payer’s liability to make that late
payment is not terminated by the payee’s death, a literal
construction of the statute would prevent all of the
payments that were made to the spouse from qualifying
as alimony. If a payment could be made after the death of
the payee, which would make it a substitute for the
liability to make payments while the payee was alive, all
of the payments would fail to qualify as alimony. If the
statute were so construed, there would be few circumstances in which the alimony provision would apply, and
the statute would lose virtually all of its significance.
To give the statute meaningful significance, the language should be construed to require only that the
liability be payable before the payee’s death. That construction conforms to the policy behind the statute. The
objection to there being a liability that first becomes
payable after the payee’s death is that the liability appears more like a property settlement arrangement than
a provision for the support of the payee. For convenience,
let us refer to the type of expenses for which support or
maintenance payments are provided as ‘‘support or
maintenance expenses.’’ No support or maintenance expenses of a payee can arise after the payee’s death, but
prior support and maintenance expenses could be unpaid at the payee’s death and so still be outstanding.
When a payment can first become due after the payee’s
death, it is likely unrelated to the support or maintenance
of the payee.14 In contrast, a payment that is first due
while the payee is alive may very well relate to support
and maintenance expenses of that payee, and the subsequent death of the payee before payment is actually
made does not indicate that a postdeath payment of that
liability is unrelated to support and maintenance expenses that were incurred before that death.
Consider another example of a situation to which the
Webb rationale would cause an inappropriate result. In
Q-7 and A-7 of temp. reg. section 1.71T(b), the regulation
provides that alimony includes a payment by the payer
spouse to a third party under a written request by the
payee spouse if specific conditions are satisfied. Suppose
that W complies with that provision and requests H to
make a payment to a creditor of W on W’s behalf, and H
agrees. Let us assume that the agreement constitutes a
binding contract. The amount first becomes payable
when the contract is made, but it is possible that W could
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stances when the presence of larger payments in the first
two years is attributable to the occurrence of contingencies over which the payer had no control. One exception
is when alimony payments cease because the payer or
payee spouse died before the close of the third year or the
payee spouse remarried before the close of that year.18
Another exception excludes from the front-loading rules
payments made under a continuing liability of no less
than three years to pay a fixed percentage of income from
a business or property or compensation from employment or self-employment.19 One might expect that other
circumstances, not mentioned in the statute, in which
payments are based on contingencies beyond the payer’s
control would also be excluded by expanding the statutory exceptions; and the payment of medical or legal
expenses would seem to be an appropriate candidate for
an expansion. Contrary to that plausible expectation, the
temporary regulations state that there are no exceptions
to front-loading other than those stated in the statute.20
While that regulation seems unduly harsh, it is likely
valid. Consequently, if, contrary to court decisions, the
payment of legal and medical expenses of the payee
spouse is treated as alimony, it will be subject to the
front-loading rules.
In conclusion, section 71(b)(1)(D) should not be construed to prohibit a liability from continuing to exist after
the payee spouse’s death if the liability can only first
become payable while the payee spouse was alive. Also,
a payment of a spouse’s legal or medical expenses under
a divorce or settlement instrument should be given
alimony treatment for tax purposes, even when the
payment may not become due until after the death of the
payee spouse.

18

Section 71(f)(5)(A).
Section 71(f)(5)(C).
20
Temp. reg. section 1.71-1T(d), A-25.
19

17

See, e.g., Rev. Rul 81-41, 1981-1 C.B. 121, in which the IRS
allows the purchase treatment of section 302(b)(2) to a redemption of voting preferred stock of a shareholder who has no actual
or constructive ownership of common stock. Such a redemption
does not comply with the requirement of section 302(b)(2) that
the shareholder’s percentage ownership of common stock after
the redemption be less than 80 percent of the percentage of
common stock that the shareholder held before the redemption.
Nevertheless, because the redemption of voting preferred stock
does not conflict with the congressional purpose for imposing
the requirement of a reduction of common stock, the IRS applies
section 302(b)(2) despite that statutory requirement. See also
prop. reg. section 1.102-1(f)(2) for another example of Treasury’s
taking a position that conflicts with the express language of a
statute.
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qualify as alimony (for the reasons stated above in the
discussion of the Webb case).
The payee spouse’s legal fees are support and maintenance expenses of that spouse. As a matter of policy, the
payer spouse’s payment of those expenses should qualify
as alimony. The possible death of the payee spouse before
the fees become payable does not give an appearance of
property settlement to the payment of those fees. The
purpose of alimony is to provide the payee spouse the
means to meet her living expenses. The attorney fees are
one of the spouse’s living expenses in that they are part of
the cost of terminating an undesirable marital relationship. It would be reasonable and appropriate for the IRS
or the courts to give alimony treatment to those payments even though a strict construction of the statutory
language provides otherwise. It is not unusual for the IRS
to ignore or modify statutory language when the application of that language conflicts with the goals and policy
of the statute.17
Consider the situation when a payer spouse is required by a divorce decree to pay the payee spouse’s
future medical expenses, and no provision is made to
terminate that liability on the payee’s death. The alimony
issues concerning payments made under that requirement are identical to those that apply to the payee
spouse’s legal fees. The payee spouse must be alive to
incur a medical expense; but the expenses are not payable
until billed; and the payee spouse could die before the
bill is delivered. It is obvious that the liability in this case
relates to the support of the payee spouse and bears no
relationship to a property settlement. Yet, a construction
of section 71(b)(1)(D) denying alimony treatment when a
liability to make payment is not terminated by the
payee’s death would prevent alimony treatment for those
payments. That situation makes a compelling case for not
applying the statute in a manner that frustrates the
purpose of allowing the tax treatment accorded to alimony.
If, contrary to the Tax Court cases denying alimony
treatment, the payment of a spouse’s legal or medical
expenses is treated as alimony, and if such expenses are
paid in the first two years in which any payments are
made to the spouse, the payment of the legal or medical
expenses would be vulnerable to recapture through the
operation of the front-loading rules. Several exceptions
preclude the front-loading rules from applying in circum-

